

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION REPORT

REPORT

CD NO.

25X1

COUNTRY East Germany

DATE DISTR. 3 February 1955

SUBJECT Estimate of the "Soft-Skinned" Vehicle Strength of the Major Units of the GSFG

NO. OF PAGES 9

PLACE ACQUIRED

NO. OF ENCLS. (LISTED BELOW)

25X1

DATE OF INFO.

SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.

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A. Introduction

This report has a cut-off date of August 1954 which was selected (1) because of the new vehicle replacement action which took place in the summer and fall of 1954 and (2) because the Soviets began changing their vehicle during the fall maneuvers. One must emphasize, however, that the 1954 vehicle replacement action up to the present date has not essentially changed the total number of Soviet Army vehicles in GSFG. Up to 1 November of this year, the 1954 action had been primarily an exchange of new vehicles for old with, however, a gradually increasing gap. More trucks came in than went out, a fact which became more and more apparent in the last few weeks. Distribution to the various armies of the GSFG has also been fairly uniform. In this respect, the 1954 in- and out-shipment of vehicles differs rather noticeably from the only other large Soviet vehicle replacement action in the last three years, the one which took place in the spring of 1952. In that year, the Soviets brought in 10,000 and sent out 8,000 trucks. Thus, although 4/5 of the incoming vehicles, were used to replace old and worn out equipment, there the vehicle strength of the GSFG was increased.

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by 2,000 new vehicles. The 10,000 new trucks brought in were sent almost exclusively to the 1st Gds Mech Army, 2d Gds Mecz Army, 4th Gds Mecz Army, 8th Gds Army, 4th Arty Corps, and the Rear Services of GSFG. A short history of significant changes in the total vehicle strength of the GSFG follows: Between 1948 and 1952 the Soviets appear to have brought in large shipments of vehicles as part of the program designed to implement the change-over of all their land armies, or at least of those in the outer military districts and in the satellites, from a still largely horse-drawn to a mobile, swiftly moving truck-drawn group of forces. This program necessitated an increase in the TO and E vehicle strength of all major units in the GSFG; in addition, supply units were also converted. GSFG also transformed the 3d and 4th Gds Mecz Armies from cadre formations into operational armies and created the following new units: the two AAA divisions belonging to the 3d and 4th Gds Mecz Armies respectively, the AAA regiments of the rifle corps and the rocket launcher regiments of the rifle corps. A large part of the vehicles coming into East Germany between 1948 and 1952 accordingly went to these units. The above four-year program appears to have been largely completed by the summer of 1952. The 1952 in- and out-shipment of trucks, as has already been indicated, was for the most part a replacement action; however, an incoming excess of 2000 new vehicles over outgoing old equipment seems to have been designed to even out inequalities in vehicle strength and bring all major

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units up to approximately the same percentage of war strength TO + E.
The 1954 program seems to be purely a vehicle replacement action. Since
the end of the 1952 shipments, the total number of Soviet Army trucks in
the CSFG has not changed appreciably.

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9. On the basis of a conservative estimate, it may be assumed that the present soft-skinned vehicle equipment of the major units of the GSFG is 85 to 90 percent of war-strength TO and E. Fixing the present vehicle strength of the 4th Gds Mecz Army at 5,600 vehicles would mean that its war-strength TO and E would be between 6,200 to 6,500 vehicles. The war-strength TO and E of the Soviet armies in Germany is estimated as follows:
- a. Mechanized armies with three component divisions 5,100 to 5,400 vehicles
 - b. Mechanized armies with four component divisions 6,200 to 6,500 vehicles
 - c. Rifle armies 7,220 to 7,640 vehicles
10. Calculations made for the other armies of the GSFG present the same picture obtained for the 4th Gds Mecz Army. It can therefore be concluded that the vehicle equipment of GSFG has changed only immaterially since the fall of 1952.

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It is believed that the vehicle equipment of the armies of the GSFG is as follows:

| | | |
|---------------------------------|----------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1st Gds Mecz Army | about 4,600 vehicles | |
| 2d Gds Mecz Army | about 4,600 | " |
| 3d Gds Mecz Army | about 5,600 | " |
| 4th Gds Mecz Army | about 5,600 | " |
| 3d Shock Army | about 6,500 | " |
| 8th Gds Army | about 6,500 | " |
| IV Arty Corps | about 2,300 | " |
| 24th Air Army | about 5,000 | " including Air Force AAA units |
| MVD units | about 1,200 | " excluding four-place vehicle numbers of MVD and Wisnut AG motor transport units |
| Units directly assigned to GSFG | about 5,500 | " |

This indicates that, in August 1954, GSFG had a total of about 47,400 vehicles excluding Soviet Navy

The vehicle replacement action which started in July 1954 has likewise not been taken into consideration.

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C. Conclusions

1. In the foregoing estimate of the "soft-skinned" vehicle strength of the major units of the GSFG shows that these units are all at 85 percent to 90 percent of war-strength TO and E. Since the summer of 1952, 17,000 new vehicles, representing approximately 1/3 of the total vehicle strength of GSFG, have come into the East Zone. The vehicle replacement actions will undoubtedly continue.
2. During World War II, the Soviets showed many examples of extremely ingenious improvisation in the repair of trucks, quite apart from their habit of cannibalizing broken-down equipment.

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3. The great number of excellent hard-surfaced main and side roads in Western Europe considerably lessens the importance of the fact that a preponderance of the GSFG vehicles at the present time have two-wheel drives and are road bound. ~~Four-wheel drive, cross-country vehicles will be useful but not essential, as they would be in a campaign in mountainous areas.~~
4. For all the above reasons, it is felt that the GSFG in the field of "soft-skinned" military transport vehicles is adequately prepared to undertake offensive combat operations, even though many of its trucks may be old and some are in poor condition and its units are not quite up to war-strength TO and E. The trucks which the Soviets used in the latter phases of World War II were certainly in no better and in a large number of cases in a much poorer state of repair. It is also felt that since there is no actual need for an extensive increase of total vehicle strength or for an overall replacement of old by new vehicles as a prelude to attack, this anticipated "need" is no larger a reliable indication of imminent hostilities. In other words, one should not rely on GSFG's sharply increasing its sum total of trucks before launching a general offensive. On the other hand, the possibility is not excluded that they may do just that.

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